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UsE OF LITERACY TESTS TO RESTRICT THE RIGHT TO VOTE
Introduction
From the time the Fifteenth Amendment' was adopted in 1870,
and particularly in the 1890's, the Southern states have made
every conceivable effort to circumvent its obvious intent. The
devices used to prevent Negroes from enjoying the privilege of
voting have run the gamut from the "grandfather clause" to the
literacy test. The means used to disfranchise the Negro have been
illegal, extralegal, direct and indirect. But the courts have not
been hesitant in looking behind the wording of the laws in dis-
covering discrimination in its most blatant form. Although these
legal obstacles have been more impressive in theory than in
practice,2 since informal methods of coercion have been used to
prevent Negro voting, there still remains one cloak of legality
behind which discrimination may be practiced with impunity, if
it appears to be necessary. This sole surviving subterfuge, which
has not been specifically struck down by the Supreme Court as un-
constitutional and which can be used with great effectiveness to
achieve the desired discrimination, is the requirement of literacy
as a qualification for voting. This device is particularly invidious,
for the reason that it is usually constitutional on its face, yet dis-
criminatory in its purpose and application. It has been used
throughout the South with varying degrees of success in keeping
Negroes from the polls. Since the "white primary" was declared
unconstitutional in 1944, and since the poll tax has lost favor be-
cause of its effect on both Negro and White, it appears that the
literacy test is the last method of exclusive discrimination which
can be applied against the Negro.
In this Note the constitutional aspects of the literacy test will
be discussed, and some review of its application in the South as
well as in the North will be presented in an attempt to indicate that
the test may be valid and efficacious in promoting good govern-
ment, and yet may also be used as a most destructive weapon
I U. S. CONST. amend. XV.
2 KEY, SOUTHERN PoLTcs 555 (1949).
3 Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
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against the basic ideals of democratic equality.
Background of the Problem
It was early pointed out by the Supreme Court that the Con-
stitution did not vest the right of suffrage in any citizen of the
United States. The granting of the voting privilege was considered
strictly a prerogative of the individual states, and the source of
this prerogative was the state constitution.4 The only exception
to this state power was afforded by the Fifteenth Amendment
which prohibited any state from basing its voting privilege on
a criterion of race. The right to vote comes from the states; right
of exemption from prohibited discrimination comes from the
United States.5
One of the most obvious attempts to prevent those of the Negro
race from voting was the "grandfather clause," which the courts
had little difficulty in striking down as being unconstitutional.6
An Oklahoma constitutional amendment provided that no one
would be allowed to register unless he could read and write, with
the exception that anyone entitled to vote, or whose ancestors were
entitled to vote, on or prior to January 1, 1866, should not be
denied registration because of his illiteracy. In referring to this
amendment the Supreme Court found that although it was not
discriminating on its face, it appeared that the only reason for
basing the classification upon a period of time prior to the Fif-
teenth Amendment was for the purpose of defeating its effect.
7
In a case decided the same day concerning another "grandfather
clause," the Supreme Court, in reviewing a Maryland statute,
stated that the Fifteenth Amendment removed the word "white"
from the Constitution of Maryland granting upon "every white
male citizen" the right to vote, and held the 1908 statute, making,
in effect, the same discrimination, to be also invalid."
After its "grandfather clause" was invalidated by the Supreme
Court, the State of Oklahoma enacted a statute which made regis-
tration a prerequisite to voting, and provided that all citizens
,qualified to vote in 1916 who failed to register between April 30,
and May 11, 1916, should be perpetually disfranchised, excepting
those who had voted in 1914. In striking down the statute, the
* United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542 (1875).
* Id. at 555-556.
6 Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915).
Id. at 365.
8 Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368 (1915).
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Supreme Court was not taken in by this subterfuge and consid-
ered it to be a very crude substitute for the previously invalidated
"grandfather clause."9
Several states attempted to set up procedural obstacles to the
enforcement of the Fifteenth Amendment by enacting statutes
which prohibited judicial review of a refusal to register those
applying for the privilege of voting. These obstacles were never
very effective, as the federal courts assumed jurisdiction of these
cases on the ground that they were not purely administrative ac-
tions, but were actually judicial proceedings.' 0
Perhaps the most effective bar to Negro participation in the
election of public officials was the "white primary." The Supreme
Court was first presented with this device of apparent legality in
1927, when it was called upon to determine if a Negro could be
prevented from voting in the Texas Democratic primary election,
pursuant to a state statute which provided that a Negro was not
eligible to particapate in such primary election. The Court had
no difficulty in finding that this was state infringement on a right
secured to the citizen by the 'equal protection clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. The Court felt the discrimination was so
complete that it was unnecessary to base its decision on the Fif-
teenth Amendment."- Immediately following this decision, the
state of Texas passed legislation permitting the party executive
committee t. prescribe qualifications for all members of the party,
Under this authority the party restricted its membership to all
"white democrats." Pursuant to this restriction the complainant
in the preceeding case was once again refused the right to vote,
and again he appealed to the Supreme Court. The Court found
for the complainant by reasoning that the executive committee's
power was statutory and that the committee was an agency of
the sfate; therefore, the state had discriminated against the com-
plainant because of his race.'2 Not easily discouraged in its efforts
to keep the Negroes from the polls, the Texas Democratic party
in full convention passed a resolution restricting membership in
the party to white citizens. Following the reasoning of the earlier
cases, the Supreme Court found that this was noi the action of
the state but of the independent party organization; and thus
there was no state action which could be curtailed under the
Fourteenth -and Fifieenth Amendments.'3 This decision was not
9 Lare v.-Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939).
1o Ibid; Bryce v. Byrd, 201 F.2d 664 (5th Cir. 1953); Hall v. Nagel, 154
F.2d 931 (5th Cir. 1946).
11 Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
12 Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932).
'. Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45" (1935)."
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destined for long life, being overruled in 1944.14 In the later de-
cision the Supreme Court followed its reasoning in a previous
case' 5 which held that a primary election in Louisiana was in
effect an election which controlled the choice of congressional
representatives. By this reasoning, the Court found that the
primary election under consideration was an election within the
meaning of the Fifteenth Amendment, and that the state of Texas
made the action of the party the action of the state.'(
Subsequently the Democratic party in Georgia was prohibited
from excluding Negroes from primary elections. 17 South Carolina
made a valiant attempt to circumvent the decision of the Supreme
Court in Smith v. Allwright Is by repealing approximately 150
statutes all relating to primaries. But this action was of no avail
as the United States district court held that the primary election
was the only real election in that state and the only place "...
where one can express a choice in selecting federal and other
officials."' 9 After recovering from the shock of this decision, the
Democratic party of South Carolina again attempted to prevent
Negroes from exercising their right to vote by establishing a dual
system of voting within the party. One section of the party's rules
provided that all white Democrats might vote; another section
permitted all qualified Negroes to vote if they presented a general
election certificate and took an oath, among other things, to sup-
port the "social and educational separation of races," and to op-
pose the Fair Employment Practices Code. The same court which
had ruled against "white primaries" the year before was vehe-
ment in its attack on this more subtle effort to disfranchise the
Negro.2 0 The court ordered the Democratic party to open their
books to all who ask to be registered, whether colored or white,
and to abstain from giving the oath.2 '
Still another form of the "white primary" persisted in Texas
until the Supreme Court held it unconstitutional in 1 9 5 3 .2 In-
stead of having but one primary election, in effect, two primaries
14 Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944). This decision declared the
"white primary" unconstitutional.
15 United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
16 Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
17 Chapman v. King, 154 F.2d 460 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 800
(1946).
18 See note 14 supra.
19 Elmore v. Rice, 72 F. Supp. 516, 528 (E.D.S.C. 1947), aff'd, 165 F.2d
387 (4th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 875 (1948).
20 Brown v. Baskin, 78 F. Supp. 933 (E.D.S.C. 1948), aff'd, 174 F.2d 391
(4th Cir. 1949).
21 78 F. Supp. at 942.
22 Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
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were held. The first was an election by the "Jaybird Democratic
Association" of candidates who were perfunctorily nominated in
second, the official Democratic party primary. Subsequently these
same candidates were elected to office as a matter of course in
the general election. This had been the practice for a period dating
back to 1889. As to this ingenious bit of discrimination the Court
held that:
The effect of the whole procedure... is to do precisely that which
the Fifteenth Amendment forbids-strip Negroes of every vestige
of influence in selecting the officials who control the local county
matters that intimately touch the daily lives of citizens.2 3
From the foregoing it appears the "white primary" has been
completely and conclusively defeated as a means of disfranchising
the Negro. Because of this the political leaders of the South have
been hard pressed to look elsewhere for a "legal" way of keeping
the Negroes away from the polls. Although the poll tax has been
declared constitutional,2 it is not an efficient device as it prevents
many whites from voting. The literacy test, consequently, emerges
as the last hope for maintaining a solid white South.
The Statutory Test
Presently there are nineteen states which have some form of
literacy requirement as a qualification for voting. Included in
this number are all but three25 of the traditionally southern
states, and twelve northern states.2 6 The statutory tests vary
greatly. The abilities to read and write, or either one or the other,
are the only tests of literacy in fourteen of the states.27 At this
23 Id. at 469-70.
24 Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U. S. 277 (1937).
25 Florida, Tennessee and Texas.
26 Arizona, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Massachusetts,
New Hampshire, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon, Washington and Wyoming.
See note 27 infra.
27 Anuz. CODE ANN. § 55-201 (1939), read constitution in English and
write name; CAL. CONST. art. II, § 1, read constitution in English and write
name; CoNN. CoNST. amend. XI, read constitution or any section of state
statutes; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 1701 (1953), read constitution in English
and write name; ME. REv. STAT. ANN. c.3, § 20 (1954), read constitution
in English and write name; MAss. Axw. LAws c.51, § 1 (1953), read con-
stitution in English and write name; N.I. CONST. Pt. 1, art. 11, read con-
stitution in English and write; N.Y. CONST. art. 2, § 1, read and write
English; N.C. GEn. STAT. § 163-28 (1952), read and write any section of
constitution to satisfaction of registrar; OimA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 61 (1955),
read and write any section of constitution; ORE. REv. STAT. § 247.040 (1953),
read and write English; S.C. CODE § 23-62 (1952), read and write any
section of constitution; WAsH. REv. CODE § 29.07.070 (1951), read and speak
English, or read aloud and explain meaning of ordinary English prose;
Wyo. Comp. STAT. ANN. § 31-104 (Supp. 1955), read constitution.
1956]
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point the similarity ends. Alabama requires that an applicant be
able to read and write any article of the Constitution in English
and to answer questions concerning his qualifications as an elector
by filling out a questionnaire prescribed by the Alabama Supreme
Court.2s Georgia requires the abilities to read and write English
plus a demonstration by the applicant of an understanding of the
duties and obligations of citizenship.2 In Louisiana it is required
that a person be able to read and write any clause in the state
or federal constitutions and to give a reasonable interpretation of
the clause, and fill out the application to vote in English or his
mother tongue.30 The Virginia statute provides that the applica-
tion be made in one's own handwriting without aid, that the appli-
cant be able to answer questions affecting his qualifications as a
voter, and the answers must be reduced to writing and made under
oath.3 1
The most recent and probably the most ambiguous test was
adopted by the state of Mississippi in amending its constitution
in 1954. The amendment sets up the following battery of qualifi-
cations: ability to read and write any section of the state constitu-
tion, ability to give a reasonable interpretation thereof to the
registrar, and the ability to demonstrate to the registrar a reason-
able understanding of the duties and obligations of citizenship
under a constitutional form of government.32
It is obvious from this summary of the different statutes that
there is some degree of ambiguity in all of them which may, in
some cases, be resolved by taking notice of the various ways in
-which these tests have been applied.
The most exemplary use of the literacy test has been made in
New York, where definite, objective standards have been estab-
lished. In 1943, twelve tests, prepared by the state department of
education and administered by the board of regents, were given
to all applicants for registration throughout the state. These
tests were designed for a sixth grade level of reading, each test
consisted of an eight to ten line composition on topics of civics,
history, geography, natural science or biography. Following this
composition were eight questions based on the composition and
which could be easily answered if the applicant could understand
what he had read. In 1945, only 9.21 per cent of those who took
the test failed it, and this in a state with an extremely large alien
28 ALA. CODE ANw. tit. 17, §§ 31, 32 (Supp. 1953).
29 GA. CoNsT. art. II, § 2-704.
30 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 18:31, 18:35 (1951).
31 VA. CODE Aim. §§ 24-68, 24-69 (1950).
32 MIss. CONST. art. 12, § 244.
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population.3 3 Moreover, the courts of New York have greatly
restricted the power of the board of election inspectors by holding
that their function was merely ministerial and not of an inquisi-
torial nature.34 Once some evidence of the applicant's qualifica-
tions, an 8th grade diploma, etc., was presented, the election in-
spectors could do nothing but register such person as a voter.3 5
New Hampshire, in order to avoid discrimination, printed its
entire constitution on cards, five lines to a card, and placed them
in boxes at the registration offices throughout the state. An appli-
cant for registration was then required to pick a card from one
of the boxes and to read that part of the constitution printed on
it. However, this procedure was not a satisfactory solution to the
problem of discrimination, as some of the cards were more dif-
ficult to read than others.36
In Massachusetts and California the literacy requirement is no
longer enforced 3 7 The registrars in Washington are very lenient,
and there are apparently no charges of discrimination. To satisfy
the requirement of an ability to read some registrars there require
the reading of a short oath, while others merely request that
something from a newspaper be read by the applicant.3 8 The
Washington Supreme Court hela a vote valid that had been cast
by a person who read rather poorly, hardly understanding it, from
a second grade reader. The ballot in this case was allowed be-
cause the voter had marked it without aid and had identified
the names of the candidates printed on it during the trial3 9
In Kentucky, the courts established a test to satisfy the school
elections law, which provided that all women could vote in such
elections if they were able to read and write. This test required
that a voter be able, by the use of alphabetical signs, to express in
a fairly legible way words in common use and of average diffi-
culty.4
0
The northern states have, at least, made some attempt to ad-
minister the literacy tests in a way which would not be discrimi-
natory against any race or nationality. New York has provided a
33 McGovNEY, Tm AammIcAw SUFFRAGE MEDLEY 63-4 (1949).
34 Koninski v. Vieser, 97 Misc. 259, 161 N.Y.S. 129 (County Ct. 1916).
-5 People ex Tel. Malawer v. Board of Elections, 51 N.Y.S.2d 216 (County
Ct. 1944).
36 McGovney, op. cit. supra note 33.
37 Id. at 62.
38 Ibid.
39 Hill v. Howell, 70 Wash. 603, 127 Pac. 211 (1912).
40 Helton v. Burdette, 180 Ky. 492, 203 S.W. 189 (1918); Williams v.




model for the use of the test in handling the difficult problem of
alien voting; for this reason it appears that the tests have some
validity and excuse for their existence. In contrast to the proce-
dure in the North, the use of the tests in the South has presented
a very different picture.
The educational tests have been widely used throughout the
South in a "bluntly illegal way" to disfranchise the Negro.4 1 Many
of the southern registration officials have spoken boastfully of
their arbitrary power to determine who will be allowed to vote.
One such officer in Georgia went so far as to claim that "God, Him-
self, couldn't understand" a certain constitutional clause as the
officer was the final judge and must be satisfied as to the correct-
ness of the answer.42 Each local registration officer is a law unto
himself regarding literacy and understanding since there are no
state agencies which have any means of control over the individ-
ual registration officials.4 3 In North Carolina, where the statutory
requirement is the ability to read and write, some registrars also
require an interpretation of the constitutional clause which has
been read, while another registrar bases his determination of the
right to vote on the general character of the Negro; for instance:
would his vote be purchasable? 44
A Mississippi official has required that poll tax receipts be pre-
sented before registration, notwithstanding the fact that the poll
tax was not authorized by the Mississippi statutes.4 5 In one rural
area in South Carolina, prospective voters were required to read
the entire state constitution.46 Virginia's requirement that a per-
son fill out the application form in his own handwriting seems
objective enough. However, in some areas blank paper was filled
in by the applicant; in Richmond Negroes and whites were both
given printed application forms, and in another area the registrar
asked questions of the applicant and filled in the application
himself.47
Four Mississippi officials testified before a United States Senate
campaign investigating committee in 1946 that they had dis-
criminated against Negroes when they applied for registration.
One of them further testified that he had told Negroes they would
have a "hard time convincing him that they were qualified."
48
41 MYRDAL, 1 Ax AmicAN Dmi An 485 (1944).
42 Id. at 485; note 34 supra.
43 KEY, SOUTHERN PoLrics 563 (1949).
44 Id. at 565.
45 Id. at 567.
46 Id. at 568.
47 Id. at 564.
48 N.Y. Times, Dec. 4, 1946, p. 64, col. 3.
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The literacy test is rarely applied in the rural areas of Louisiana
for the simple reason that physical coercion, threats and fear keep
the Negro from exercising his voting privilege.49 Registration in
Macon County, Alabama, 81 per cent Negro, was completely
stalled when in 1946 the board of registrars resigned, and no new
board was established for two years. It seemed the registrars had
been sued by a Negro for refusing to register him, and no other
citizens of the county were willing to risk the cost of such a suit,
for the remuneration given a registrar was only $7.50 a day.50
Another registrat in South Carolina refused to perform his duties
until he was informed that the National Association for the Ad-
vancement of Colored People was going to be brought in by the
Negroes of the county.51
The questions asked Negroes when they attempted to register
point out clearly the fact that they have been denied registration
simply because they were members of the Negro race. In Bir-
mingham, Alabama, these questions were put to Negroes request-
ing the right to vote: What do we mean by the U.N.? How old are
your wife's father and mother? Who is in charge of street im-
provements in Birmingham?5 2 An intelligent Negro woman in
North Carolina was denied registration because she mispro-
nounced "contingency" and "constitutionality" when she read
the state constitution.53 In the same state a Negro school teacher,
after reading a section of the constitution, was asked to define
certain terms in that section. To this she replied, "This is not part
of the law, to define terms;" and the registrar replied, "You must
satisfy me, and don't argue with me."54 Pursuant to the Virginia
Constitution, which required that an applicant for registration
answer questions affecting his qualifications as an: elector, a Negro
was asked these questions: "What is meant by a legal resident
of Virginia? When is the payment of the poll tax not required?
What are the requisites necessary for registration in Virginia? "-
The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held the second and third
questions were immaterial to a determination of the applicant's
qualifications as a voter, and the written answer to the first ques-
tion, "All persons Who have lived in the Stat- for one year are
49 KEY, op. cit. supra note 43, at 573.
50 Id. at 572.
51 Id. at 568.
52 Id. at 572 n. 22, as reported in the Birmingham News Feb. 11, 13,
18, 20, 1948. The articles were written by Dr. Douglas L. Hunt.
53 MYRDAL, 1 AN A=mCAN DmLEmoA 485 (1944).
54 Ibid.
55 The original form of the questions contained several grammatical
and spelling errors which have been corrected.
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a Legal Residenter," [sic] was substantially correct.5 6
In Alabama during the time the "Boswell Amendment" (dis-
cussed infra) was in effect, which required that an applicant for
registration "understand and explain" any clause of the Consti-
tution, several Negro Ph.D.'s failed to pass a test given by the
registrars. One of the questions asked was, "How many bubbles
are there in a bar of soap?"'57 And it has been reported that a
Negro graduate of Harvard, when he applied for registration in
Mississippi, was asked to read the Bible, the Constitution, a
Latin book and a Greek text, which he did successfully. Then
he was asked to read a Chinese laundry ticket, and when asked
what it meant, he replied "It means that you white folks are not
going to let me vote."5 8
In the main these reported cases of discrimination appear to
have been isolated and infrequent, occurring almost entirely in
those rural areas where there was a large Negro population.
Nevertheless, where it was possible to reject 50 per cent of the
qualified Negro voters in one county on the basis of a simple
writing test,59 it appears obvious that unconstitutional discrim-
ination has occurred and will persist under subjective-type lit-
eracy tests. A pertinent observation has been made in a study of
this problem to the effect that if the New York statute had been
applied in Louisiana, at least 100,000 adult Negroes in that state
would have been entitled to vote, instead of the 886 then regis-
tered under the Louisiana statutes.6° Another important fact
which cannot be overlooked is the almost complete lack of po-
litical activity on the part of the American Negro. In a recent
survey it was disclosed that only 15 per cent of the qualified
Negroes in the United States were active in politics, while 60
per cent were very inactive; this was the highest percentage of
inactivity within any of the sub-groups surveyed.61 Furthermore,
it does not appear that the situation has improved, for the
number of Negroes voting in the 1952 presidential election was
slightly less than the number voting in the 1948 election.62 It is
impossible to determine with any certitude to what extent this
political inactivity can be attributed to the various literacy tests,
but it can scarcely be denied that they do have some effect in
keeping the Negro out of politics.
56 Davis v. Allen, 157 Va. 84, 160 S.E. 85 (1931).
57 Verney, The Amrerican Negro, 1 POL. Sci. Q. 128 (1955).
58 EMBREE, BROWN AMERICA 184 (1931).
59 KEY, SOUTHERN PoLnIcs 565 (1950).
60 McGovNEY, THE AmEUCAN SUFFRAGE MEDLEY 70 (1949).
61 Woodward and Roper, Political Activity of American Citizens, 44
Ai. POL. Sci. REV. 872, 877 (1950).
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Constitutionality of the Tests
The Supreme Court in an early decision ruled that a state did
not violate the Fourteenth Amendment by subjecting its pro-
spective voters to a test of literacy.63 The test in that case, Wil-
liams v. Mississippi, required that a person read any section of
the state constitution, or as an alternative be able to understand
the clause or give a reasonable interpretation of it. The Court
made its ruling on the ground that the statutes were not dis-
criminatory on their face, and there was no evidence presented
to show any discrimination in their application. The Court did
note, however, that the evil of racial discrimination was possible
under the statutes reviewed. 64
In a later case which involved a socalled "grandfather
clause,"' ' a the Supreme Court held that a literacy test standing
alone was a lawful exercise of state power, not subject to judi-
cial supervision. But, because of its connection with the uncon-
stitutional "grandfather clause," the test was struck down by the
Court because the purpose of the state constitutional amend-
ment would have been nullified had the literacy test been al-
lowed to stand alone.
Subsequently it was decided that a test of reading, with the
further requirement of an ability to give a reasonable interpre-
tation of any clause in the state or Federal Constitutions, was
valid, since it applied to all voters, both colored and white, and
because there was no evidence of any actual discrimination. The
complainant had failed to set out in his complaint the words he
had used in his attempt to interpret the state constitution.6 6
The Supreme Court of North Carolina, in sustaining a demur-
rer to an action for a declaratory judgment, considered a test of
reading and writing to the registrar's satisfaction to be constitu-
tional. The test was not class legislation as it applied to all the
citizens of North Carolina.6 7 The court was also of the opinion
that because of the state's great advancement in the field of edu-
cation, the requirement of literacy would not prove discrimina-
tory for either colored or white.
A most important pronouncement on the subject of literacy
tests was given by the United States District Court for the South-
62 CABiPBELL, GuRIN & MILLER, THE VoTER DECIDES 71, (1954).
63 Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213 (1898).
64 Id. at 225.
65 Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915).
66 Trudeau v. Barnes, 1 F. Supp. 453 (S.D. La. 1932), aff'd, 65 F. 2d
563 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 659 (1933).
67 Allison v. Sharp, 209 N.C. 477, 184 S.E. 27 (1936).
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ern District of Alabama, when it was held, by a three judge court,
that the "Boswell Amendment" to the Alabama State Constitu-
tion was a violation of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amend-
ments.68 This amendment provided that no one would be regis-
tered as a voter unless he had the ability to "understand and ex-
plain" any clause of the constitution. The court declared the
amendment unconstitutional both in its purpose and the manner
of its administration. Judicial notice was taken of the history of
the period immediately prior to the adoption of the amendment,
and there was no doubt, as far as the court was concerned, that
the amendment was passed to avoid the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Smith v. Aliwright, supra, (white primary held unconsti-
tutional). The court found that the board of registrars had the
arbitrary power to accept or reject any one applying for regis-
tration, and that this type of arbitrary power had been con-
demned by the Supreme Court in the landmark case of Yick Wo
v. Hopkins.6 9 The action was brought against the registrars of
Mobile County, Alabama, to prevent the registrars from enforc-
ing the provisions of the amendment. Mobile County, at that time,
had a population of 230,000, 36 per cent of which were Negroes;
2800 Whites and 104 Negroes were registered in the county. It
was also disclosed by the county's records that fifty-seven Ne-
groes had been refused registration because they could not "un-
derstand and explain" the constitution, while eleven whites had
been refused registration, but not for failing to meet the require-
ments of the amendment. After a consideration of all these facts,
the court had no doubt in finding that the "Boswell Amendment"
was a definite attempt to disfranchise the Negro in Alabama.
This decision was subsequently affirmed, per curiam, by the Su-
preme Court in a memorandum decision70
In a recent case in Louisiana, the federal district court de-
clined to consider the constitutionality of a constitutional amend-
ment which provided that a person seeking to be registered be
able to read any part of the constitution and give a reasonable
interpretation thereof. 7 ' The plaintiffs in this class action were
unable to fill out application forms in the specified manner, and
for this reason they were not registered. It was shown that ap-
proximately 300 Whites and 800 Negroes had been denied regis-
6 Davis v. Schmell, 81 F. Supp. 872 (S.D. Ala. 1949), affd nem., 336
U.S. 933 (1949).
69 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
70 See note 66 supra. Court cited Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939);
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, note 69 supra; and Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S.
213 (1898).
71 Williams v. McCulley, 128 F. Supp. 897 (W.D.La. 1955).
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tration for the same reason. The court ruled that no discrimina-
tion had been proven and decided, therefore, that no decision
on the constitutionality of the amendment was necessary. The
court was not disposed to, "... impose on state and local au-
thorities our conception of what constitutes a proper administra-
tion of their offices, so long as there is no discrimination and the
laws are equally administered."7 2 Also, the court specifically de-
nied that it was in any way intimating an ultimate answer to the
constitutional question involved in the case.
From the review of these cases, it is important to note that the
federal courts have been reluctant to interfere with the sov-
ereignty of the states in granting the right of suffrage, unless of
course there is a clear violation of the Constitution. However, as
demonstrated in the cases, a clear violation is exceedingly diffi-
cult to prove.
Conclusion
The question of the Negro's status in the South still remains
the primary obstacle to achieving greater democracy in that part
of the United States which has long been an enigma to those who
have studied its problems. 3 To the serious students of southern
problems, the solution is not expected to be instantaneous by the
abolishing of any one discriminatory law, but many observers
agree that this is an essential step toward the ultimate goal of
racial equality. The courts have often appeared reluctant to or-
der the states to meet their obligations to provide constitutional
equality to Negroes and the courts have increased the difficulty of
arriving at the ultimate solution to the problem by refusing to
recognize the southern literacy tests for what they are. To dodge
the issue by refusing to take notice of the commonly known in-
cidents of discrimination, is sacrificing the constitutional rights
of the Negro for an exasperating adherence to the rules of evi-
dence. "To do this would be to shut our eyes to what all others
than we can see and understand." 74 The very words of the tests
themselves patently permit the exercise of that arbitrary power
so vehemently condemned by the Supreme Court in Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, supra. Can an ordinary layman satisfactorily interpret
a clause of the Constitution when the most learned lawyers of
the country arrive at diametrically opposed conclusions on the
72 Id. at 899.
"3 Kzy, SOUTHERN PoLITCs 675 (1949).
74 United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 61 (1936).
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same clause? To ask the question is to answer it. This of course
is not to condemn the literacy test as such, as it has been use
with beneficial results, and if based on the theory that it is to in-
sure an intelligent electorate it is valid. But to allow it to stand
when its purpose is to disfranchise a great proportion of the
American citizens is to admit that democracy cannot be fulfilled,
since the privilege of voting is the very essence of the democra-
tic system. The Supreme Court recently handed down an historic
decision in refusing to continue the concept of "separate but
equal" in the field of southern education." This is some indica-
tion that the traditional methods of "legal" discrimination will no
longer be tolerated by the courts. It can only be hoped that the
courts will invoke this uncompromising ideal of equality to give
to every eligible Negro his right to vote.
Ralph R. Blume
75 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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